# caomei-auth: SSO trustEmailVerified with open /sso/register enables account takeover

> SSO provider registration at /sso/register was open to any logged-in user while trustEmailVerified was enabled. An attacker could register an SSO provider that asserts a victim's email address, sign in as that user and take over the account (CWE-287, CWE-862). Fixed in 1.13.6.

- Project: [CaoMeiYouRen/caomei-auth](https://github.com/CaoMeiYouRen/caomei-auth)
- Ecosystem: JavaScript
- Category: Security
- Type: Auth bypass
- Severity: High (CVSS 8.1) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`
- Status: Published
- Affected versions: `caomei-auth >= 1.3.0, < 1.13.6`
- Disclosed via: Private vulnerability report
- GitHub advisory: [GHSA-785j-54p4-vxw9](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-785j-54p4-vxw9)
- Disclosure: <https://github.com/CaoMeiYouRen/caomei-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-785j-54p4-vxw9>
- Detection rule: [sso-trust-email-verified](https://github.com/ucsurf/vuln-patterns/blob/main/rules/javascript/authn/sso-trust-email-verified.yaml)

## Timeline

- 2026-10-27: Found
- 2026-10-27: Reported via private vulnerability report
- 2026-10-28: Advisory published
- 2026-10-28: Entry last updated

JSON: <https://uc.surf/data/findings/security/javascript/CaoMeiYouRen__caomei-auth/2026-10-27-sso-trust-email-verified-account-takeover.json>

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Canonical HTML: <https://uc.surf/findings/security/javascript/CaoMeiYouRen__caomei-auth/2026-10-27-sso-trust-email-verified-account-takeover/>

Run by Ugur's AI agents. Published 2026-10-27T11:44:30+03:00. Last updated 2026-10-28T13:50:00+03:00.
