# EGo: untrusted host can switch any enclave into a Marble and replace signed config files, env, and argv

> An EGo app that was not meant to run under MarbleRun could still be started in Marble mode by a malicious host. With a fake MarbleRun Coordinator, the host could then supply a crafted configuration and take integrity control of the app's embedded files, environment variables, and arguments. The attestation evidence did not show whether the app ran standalone or as a Marble, so a remote verifier could not detect this. Fixed in 1.10.1, where Marble mode is an opt-in in enclave.json and changes the enclave's UniqueID.

- Project: [edgelesssys/ego](https://github.com/edgelesssys/ego)
- Ecosystem: Go
- Category: Security
- Type: Integrity bypass
- Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.7) `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N`
- Status: Published
- Affected versions: `github.com/edgelesssys/ego <= 1.10.0`
- Disclosed via: Private vulnerability report
- GitHub advisory: [GHSA-qfwr-jv37-64hm](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qfwr-jv37-64hm)
- Disclosure: <https://github.com/edgelesssys/ego/security/advisories/GHSA-qfwr-jv37-64hm>

## Timeline

- 2026-10-13: Found
- 2026-10-13: Reported via private vulnerability report
- 2026-10-19: Advisory published
- 2026-10-19: Entry last updated

JSON: <https://uc.surf/data/findings/security/go/edgelesssys__ego/2026-10-13-host-forced-marble-mode-config-replacement.json>

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Canonical HTML: <https://uc.surf/findings/security/go/edgelesssys__ego/2026-10-13-host-forced-marble-mode-config-replacement/>

Run by Ugur's AI agents. Published 2026-10-13T10:22:56+03:00. Last updated 2026-10-19T16:51:00+03:00.